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Abstract
In several verdicts of judicial review, the Constitutional Court formulates 
a concept of Open Legal Policy. The concept begins from a condition when a 
norm of  law submitted to judicial review by the 1945 Constitution does not 
have reference in the 1945 Constitution. In other words, the open legal policy 
is a condition when the Constitutional Court cannot find any reference for the 
norm submitted to the judicial review. By using a construction method, this 
present research tries to find the meaning of a concept of open legal policy 
arranged by the Constitutional Court, then assessing whether the concept is in 
line with the spirit of judicial review. If the formulation of the concept done 
by the Constitutional Court has not been ideal, the deconstruction will be 
conducted toward the meaning that already exists until the open legal policy 
ideal with the perspective of the constitution is found. In this research, the 
finding shows different meaning of open legal policy between various verdicts 
of the Constitutional Court. Moreover, a new meaning is proposed including 
improvement of criteria of the open legal policy based on the difference between 
the object of regulation (what) and the content of the regulation (how).
Keywords: Open Legal Policy, Construction, Deconstruction
I.  INTRODUCTION
The Constitutional Court is a court which is established based on mandate 
of Article 24 paragraph (2) and the Transitional Provisions Article III of the 1945 
Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia (further it is called as 
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the 1945 Constitution). The authority of the Constitutional Court is regulated 
in Article 24C paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution.
Judicial review is the main authority of the Constitutional Court since the 
aim of the Constitutional Court is as an institution who is authorized to do a 
judicial review (examining constitutionality of law). Judicial review is basically 
an assessment  about suitability between substance of the norm of law with 
norm of the 1945 Constitution. 
Judicial review becomes relative and difficult when the 1945 Constitution does 
not explicitly regulates the material of law which is in the process of judicial 
review. If the material is not clearly mentioned in the 1945 Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court needs to use a general norm written in the 1945 Constitution 
as reference. The Constitutional Court even needs to use implied meaning of 
the 1945 Constitution.
Whether the norm of the 1945 Constitution used as reference has already 
been available in a judicial review, the Constitutional Court still needs to assess 
whether that norm is in line with the constitution. The absence of the 1945 
Constitution, which clearly regulates the material of law in a judicial review, 
results a new concept in assessing constitutionality of the law. That is the concept 
of open legal policy (Kebijakan Hukum Terbuka/KHT).
In various verdicts, the Constitutional Court declares that law is valued as 
constitutional since the provision of the material of the law is open legal policy, 
that is the policy in the field of law (legal policy) whose the characteritic is open. 
Several verdicts of the Constitutional Court1 shows that the concept of open legal 
policy is valued and categorized as “constitutional”. It means, the entire open 
1 Judicial Review Number 12 of 2003 on General Election of the Members of the People Representatives’ Council, 
Regional Representatives’ Council, and Regional People Representatives’ Council against the 1945 Constitution, 
No. 16/PUU-V/2007 (The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2007); Judicial Review Number 42 
of 2008 on General Election of President and Vice President against the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia, No. 51–52–59/PUU–VI/2008 (the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2008); Judicial Re-
view Number 10 of 2008 on General Election of the Members of the People Representatives’ Council , Regional 
Representatives’ Council, and Regional People Representatives’ Council, No. 3/PUU-VII/2009 (the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2009); Judicial Review Number 23 of 2011 on the Management of Zakat 
against the 1945 Constitution, No. 86/PUU-X/2012 (The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2012); 
Judicial Review Number 8 of 2012 on General Election of the Members of the People Representatives’ Council , 
Regional Representatives’ Council, and Regional People Representatives’ Council against the 1945 Constitution 
of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 2/PUU-XI/2013 (The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2013); 
Judicial Review Number 44 of 2009 on Hospital against the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 
38/PUU-XI/2013 (2013).
Requirements for 
a Judicial Review 
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legal policy are valued and in line with the constitution2. The Constitutional 
Court has never used the concept of open legal policy when stating that a law 
is unconsitutional.3
If the open legal policy is interpreted as freedom for legislator to freely 
creates the content of law, this matter potentially will result arbitrariness if 
there is not any guidance from the 1945 Constitution. The meaning of open 
legal policy then will be used by the legislator to “justify” law when it is under 
judicial review by the Constitutional Court.4
However, a contradictive indication arised when the Verdict No. 4/PUU-
VII/2009 exists, the Constitutional Court states that “...from the perspective of 
legal morality, that is justice, although the formulation of such norm has fulfilled 
the procedural requirements, it cannot automatically be categorized as a legal 
policy which does not need to be assessed/reviewed through a judicial review 
since the legal norm of the a quo is clearly not in line with justice.”5
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
From the background of the problem above, it can be formulated the 
following research questions:
1. What is the meaning of Open Legal Policy in verdicts of judicial review at 
the Constitutional Court?
2 Moh. Mahfud MD states that when the 1945 Constitution submitted the regulation of a particular material to 
the law (attribution), then the law is going through a judicial review by the Constitutional Court, then the Court 
cannot decide whether that law is cancelled or not. If the Court conducts a judicial review to decide whether 
the Law is cancelled or not, it means, according to Mahfud MD, the Court has exceed its limit by entering the 
legislative area (establishing a law).  See M. D Mahfud, Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2009), 
99; M. D Mahfud, Konstitusi dan Hukum dalam Kontroversi Isu (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2009), 28–283.
3 Judicial Review Number 32 of 2004 on Regional Government against the 1945 Constitution, No. 006/PUU-III/2005 
(The Constitutional Court 2005). Here, the term open legal policy was used for the first time, but the Constitu-
tional Court uses it in verdicts thereater. In that verdict, the Constitutional Court argues that legislators can freely 
decides whether the election of regional head is part of the General Election ruled by the 1945 Constitution in 
Artikel 22E or whether the election is not part Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution . So, the Constitutional Court 
is authorized to resolve that conflict.
4 Judicial Review Number 15 of 2011 on General Election against the 1945 Constitution, No. 31/PUU-XI/2013 
(the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2013); Judicial Review Number 3 of 2009 on the Second 
Amendment of Indonesian Law Number 14 of 1985 on the Constitutional Court against the 1945 Constitution 
of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 25/PUU-XI/2013 (the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2013); 
Judicial Review Number 8 of 2015 on the Amendment of Indonesian Law Number 1 of 2015 on the Enactment 
of Government Regulation in Lieu of Laws Number 1 of 2014 on the Election of Governor, Regent, and Mayor 
into Law against the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 80/PUU-XIII/2015 (The Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2015). 
5 Judicial Review Number 10 of 2008 on General Election of the Members of the People Representatives’ Council, 
Regional Representatives’ Council, and Regional People Representatives’ Council; Judicial Review Number 32 of 
2004 on Regional Government against the 1945 Constitution.
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2. How is the ideal criteria of the open legal policy in verdicts of judicial review 
at the Constitutional Court? 
III. RESEARCH METHOD
3.1 Research Paradigm
Rational acts of a human are basically meaningful. There is always an implied 
meaning behind the act of human that is used as the shield to justify that act. 
That matter is like a structure of a building which is used to form, navigate, 
stimulate, and control the act of a human being.
In a perspective of knowledge, by using the term by Thomas Kuhn, that structure 
is also can be called as a paradigm.6 George Ritzer explains that the paradigm 
initiated by Kuhn is, “…a fundamental picture of particular primary problem”.7 
 Further, Ritzer explains that a paradigm helps someone to decide something 
that should be studied, questions that should be proposed, the way to propose 
questions, and tools to interpret the data to answer the questions. Ritzer clearly 
states that a paradigm is a “consensus unit” in a knowledge that helps people to 
distinguish between one community to another one. A paradigm can be used to 
categorize, decide, and connect various theories, methods, and the instruments 
involved.8
In brief, the law’s paradigm consists of: i) paradigm of natural law, ii) 
paradigm of historical law, iii) utilitarianism, iv) the paradigm of positive law, v) 
the paradigm of sociological law, vi) the paradigm of pragmatic realist law.9 vii) 
paradigm of deliberative democracy,10  and viii) the paradigm of postmodernism 
law.11
6 Thomas Kuhn, Peran Paradigma dalam Revolusi Sains, 6th Printing (Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya., 2008), 
10–11.
7 George Ritzer and Douglas Goodman, Teori Sosiologi Modern (Jakarta: Kencana, 2004), A-13.
8 Ibid. 
9 Lili Rasjidi and Ida Bagus Wyasa Putra, Hukum Sebagai Suatu Sistem (Bandung: Mandar Maju, 2003), 109–28.
10 Deliberative democracy is a democracy whose law is to gain legitimacy from a discourse of the people/citizen/
parties who have the same interest. Those parties are on the same level. See Reza Wattimena, Melampaui Negara 
Hukum Klasik: Locke-Rousseau-Habermas (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2007). Compare to Budi Hardiman, Melampaui 
Positivisme dan Modernitas (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2003), 128–30. 
11 Postmodernism tends to deny and leave ideas involving in modernism era. See Akhyar Yusuf Lubis, Postmodernisme 
Teori dan Metode (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2014), 15.
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This present research is based on the paradigm of post-modernism.12 
 The reason behind it is this research tries to find interpretation of open legal 
policy used by the Constitutional Court in verdicts of judicial review. Therefore, 
this research is limited to discuss provisions (verdicts of the Constitutional Court), 
principal matters, doctrines, arguments, opinions, theories,  and legal philosohy. 
3.2 Research Method
In relation to the idea of open legal policy conveyed by the Constitutional 
Court which has been categorized earlier, it is categorized before being 
constructed to find the meaning and reference of the open legal policy. After 
the constructivism found a concept of open legal policy, then the earlier one is 
completed and rechecked by using other sources and interviews.
In the present research, the method of construction is defined as a method 
which tries to complete the meaning of open legal policy. The meaning had not 
been complete since the phrase “open legal policy” is not fully formulated in 
particular laws and regulations. The Constitutional Court only formulated it in 
chunk through verdicts of judicial reviews.
Keith E. Whittington argues that the construction (in a phrase of the 
construction of constitution) is not a matter of finding meaning who has 
not arised (pre-existing), whose the meaning is hidden in documents of the 
establishment of constitution. The construction tries to find the meaning and 
also to learn political reasons behind the establishment of a constitution. In 
this method, the political characters are even bolder than the legal characters.13
The next step is to do analysis towards the concept of open legal policy. The 
aim is to assess whether the concept has been in line with other concepts in 
legal science, and whether the concept has been able to answer or given solution 
to the legal problems related to the establishment and judicial review of law. 
If the existing concept cannot become the legal solution, therefore an effort by 
using hermeneutics is done, especially through deconstructibve hermeneutics. 
12 The limitation of the modernism and post-modernism cannot be defined clearly. Criticisms on modernism does 
not always end as post-modernisms (it is like postmodernism ideas of Derrida, Bourdieau, dan Giddens). Some 
criticism stay on modernism (such as Habermas).
13 Whittington Keith, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1999), 5. 
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Based on Derrinda, deconstruction is...“a way to read a text interpretatively 
or a hermeneutics in a radical manner”.14 So, what is the difference between 
hermeneutics used to find the original intent from hermeneutics used as a 
method to do a deconstruction? Hardiman explains as follow,
 “A deconstruction is different from the ‘normal’ hermeneutik  which tries to reconstruct 
the real meaning of a text. A deconstruction leaves the rehabilitating effort. Instead 
of providing the real meaning of a text, a deconstruction assumes the absence of 
promordial meaning (Ursinn)”.15
A radical hermeneutics is chosen since that character helps us to find the 
appropriate meaning by letting us stop and move everywhere. The result from 
this deconstruction is not a stable meaning. However, from the instability, which 
makes the meaning becomes “fragile” to be changed, the connecting line needed 
by the Constitutional Court is found. Based on Kimmerle, a deconstruction is 
an interpretation which is marked as “continuous change of perspective”.16
A Constitutional Court as a court which becomes the final judge to interpret 
a constitution,17 when conducting a hearing of a case, it is faced by a need to 
find a meaning which is in line with the constitution or the 1945 Constitution. 
However, sometimes the meaning which can answer the need related to justice 
is not the real one. The contextual meaning when the legal norm is established 
sometimes can answer it. Sometimes those two meaning cannot even answer 
the need of justice, so another way to find the meaning is needed, a current 
contextual meaning for instance.
Without the ability to do a radical deconstruction, the Constitutional Court 
will lost its “soul” as a constitutional court whose duty is to protect the rights 
of the people. It means, this will downgrade the Constitutional Court into a 
general court whose duty is only to implement the law.
Both the constructive or deconstructive method is basically comes from the 
similarity of the purpose, such as explaining, interpreting, and/or completing the 
14 Budi Hardiman, Filsafat Fragmentaris (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2007), 163. 
15 Hardiman, 163; Budi Hardiman, Seni Memahami: Hermeneutik dari Schleiermacher Sampai Derrida (Yogyakarta: 
Kanisius, 2015), 283–85.
16 Hardiman, Seni Memahami: Hermeneutik Dari Schleiermacher Sampai Derrida, 285.
17 Jimly Asshiddiqie, Peradilan Etik dan Etika Konstitusi: Perspektif Baru Tentang ‘Rule of Law and Rule of Ethics’ & 
Constitutional Law and Constitutional Ethics’, 2nd Edition (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2015), 238. 
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concept of open legal policy which has been formulated by the Constitutional 
Court. The two methods are in the area of new law (new finding), therefore it 
can be categorized as legal hermeneutics.18
IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 The Criteria of Open Legal Policy (KHT) in Verdicts of Judicial Review 
Conducted by the Constitutional Court
The research is conducted to 940 verdicts of judicial reviews. The verdicts are 
from the very first time of verdict done by the Constitutional Court in August 
2003 until the verdict done in October 2016. From 940 verdicts, there are 77 
verdicts which consist of term Open Legal Policy, and the rest (863 verdicts) 
does not consist of the term open legal policy.
Further, from 77 verdicts consisting of term Open Legal Policy, 30 verdicts 
also consist of a brief description and/or explanation/argumentation behind 
the reason why the Constitutional Court reviewed the provision of law and 
categorized it into open legal policy. 47 verdicts only mention term Open Legal 
Policy without providing further explanation/argumenation which can be used 
as reference to find the meaning of Open Legal Policy. 
In a verdict No. 27/PUU-V/2007 about a judicial review No. 3 Year 2005 about 
the National Sports System, the Constitutional Court conveys “...that matter is 
the option (related to the policy) given to the legislator to regulate the law which 
does not have any relation to the constitutionality of a norm”. The quotation 
shows that based on the Constitutional Court, there is an option of legal policy 
which becomes the rights or obligation of the legislator. The constitutionality of 
the option cannot be reviewed. That concept is repeated by the Constitutional 
Court, that is in the verdict No. 30/PUU-XIII/2015, verdict No. 46/PUU-XIII/2015, 
and verdict No. 120/PUU-XIII/2015.
18 Sudikno Mertokusumo, Penemuan Hukum Sebuah Pengantar (Yogyakarta: Liberty, 2004), 56. See also Aharon 
Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 55.
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It is different from the four verdicts which review that the constitutionality 
of the open legal policy cannot be reviewed/examined, the constitutionality 
of the open legal policy of some verdicts can be reviewed, even have to 
be reviewed. In a verdict No. 006/PUU-III/2005 about judicial review 
32/2004 about the local government, it is stated that “...the legal policy 
which cannot be reviewed except if it is done arbitrarily (willekeur) 
and exceeds the authority of the legislator (detournement de pouvoir).”19 
The bolded phrases show the requirements for an open legal policy to be able 
to be reviewed to a judicial review. The requirement for following a judicial 
review is different from the requirement to be categorised as open legal policy.
“Requirements of a judicial review” is a condition which has to be fulfilled (in 
this case is legal provisions), so it can follow a procedure of the review. Whether 
the requirements are fulfilled or not, this will not affect the result of the review. 
Although the requirements have been fulfilled, it does not guarantee for passing 
the review. The requirement of a review is like an entry gate to follow a judicial 
review. Meanhwile, to pass the review itself, there is an assessment to be fulfilled.
An object of a review is not always what is being faced by the requirements 
of the review. A legal provisions in front of “requirements of a judicial review” 
cannot be considered as an object of a judicial review. “Requirements for a review” 
have to be fulfilled by the provisions of a particular law so it can be stated as 
an object of a judicial review. After the legal provisions become an object of a 
judicial review, so it finally can be examined/reviewed through judicial review.
19  The principle for not being arbitrary and the principlce for not exceeding the authority of a legislator are part 
of good governmental principles in Netherland which come from a jurisprudence of general courts. It is then 
developed to be Wet AROB especially for the ban of detornement de pouvoir and the ban for being arbitrary. 
The principle is conducted in Indonesia in a law 5/1986 about State Administrative Judiciary which is changed 
with the law 9/2004 and and 51/2009. It is possible that the Constitutional Court refers to the principle which is 
formulated in the explanation of Article 53 (2) b of law 9/2004. See also Philipus Hadjon et al., Pengantar Hukum 
Administrasi Indonesia, 7th Printing (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2001), 270–82; Cekli Pratiwi et 
al., Penjelasan Hukum Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan yang Baik (AUPB) Hukum Administrasi Negara (Jakarta: 
LeIP, 2016), 25–30; Muchsan, Pengantar Hukum Administrasi Negara Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Liberty, 1982); Soe-
hartono, “Eksistensi Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan yang Baik sebagai Dasar Pengujian Keabsahan Keputusan 
Tata Usaha Negara di Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara,” Jurnal Yustisia 83 (n.d.); I Gede Eka Putra, AAUPB sebagai 
Dasar Pengujian dan Alasan Menggugat Keputusan Tata Usaha Negara (Pengadilan Tata Usahan Negara 2017).
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Chart 1
Steps for the Requirements for A Judicial Review of Legal Norm
Legal norm 
as an object 
of judicial 
review
Legal norm
Requirements 
for a judicial 
review
Sources: Author
The difference between the requirements for a review from “requirements 
to be assessed/categorised as an open legal policy” is the condition which  has 
to be fulfilled by the object of the review so it can be categorised as legal norm 
whose characteristic is like the open legal policy. If the requirements cannot 
be fulfilled, so the object of a review can be categorised as a legal norm whose 
characteritstic is not like an open legal policy.
In a verdict No. 006/PUU-III/2005, the Constitutional Courts argues that “...is 
a legal policy which cannot be reviewed except it is done arbitrarily (willekeur) and 
exceeds the authority of the legislator (detournement de pouvoir)”. The previous 
quotation from a verdict explains that there is a  possibility that arbitrariness 
(willekeur) and exceeding the authority (detournement de pouvouir) are two 
requirements for a legal norm of open legal policy to be reviewed in a judicial 
review.
Chart 2
The Steps: Requirements  for a Legal Norm to be the Object of a 
Judicial Review and Being Assessed as an Open Legal Policy by the 
Constitutional Court
Legal norm is 
considered as an 
open legal policy 
and becomes the 
object of judicial 
review
Legal norm 
as an object 
of judicial 
review
Requirements: 
willekeur, 
detournement 
de pouvoir, 
against the  1945 
Constitution
Source: Author
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If the meaning is as being stated before, judicial review written in verdict 
No. 006/PUU-III/2005 is a review of legal norm of open legal policy toward the 
Constitution 1945. In other words, the verdict of the Constitutional Court quoted 
above assumes that a norm that will be reviewed needs to be a legal norm of an 
open legal policy. The concept of the review needs assumption. The assumption 
is at a pre-judicial review, the Constitutional Court needs to know whether the 
legal norm is open legal policy.
The understanding is confirmed by verdict No. 10/PUU-III/2005 about the 
judicial review of Law 32/2004 about a local government. It conveys that:
“...as long as the option of the policy does not exceed the authority of the legislator 
and it does not misuse the authority, and also does not against provisions written 
in 1945 Constitution, so this kind of policy cannot be reviewed inthrough judicial 
review by the Court”.
The question arised is how the Constitutional Court knows that the policy 
does not exceed the authority of the legislator, does not misuse the authority, 
and does not against the 1945 Constitution, without conducting a judicial review 
towards the option (policy)?
In the verdict No. 10/PUU-III/2005, this verdict confirms the concept of 
“requirements of a review” written in verdict No. 006/PUU-III/2005, that the 
Constitutional Court needs to know whether the legal norm is open legal policy 
or not, then the Court can decide to do a judicial review or not. From the 
provision, it is known that in judicial review, the Constitutional Court provides 
several steps to filter the case, those are i) deciding whether a legal norm is 
open legal policy ii) whether a norm of open legal policy is considered having 
constitutional value or not.
This kind of concept needs further assumption, that is an assumption that 
“valued as open legal policy” is not always “valued its constitutionality”. It means, 
a legal norm which is valued as open legal policy by the Court is in fact not 
always having constitutionality value. In brief, from the sentence, the mening 
can be infered from the sentence “...therefore the option of the policy can not 
follow judicial review...” in a verdict 10/PUU-III/2005, in a contrario manner shows 
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options of policy which can follow a judicial review. This meaning is confirmed 
by a verdict No. 130/PUU-VII/2009 about a review of a law 10/2008 about a 
general election of the members of People Representative Council, Regional 
Representatives, and Regional People Representatives Council.
Chart 3
The Steps of Judicial Review
of a “Legal Norm Which is Considered as an Open Legal Policy” in 
Verdicts of the Constitutional Court
A legal 
norm of an 
open legal 
policy which 
becomes 
and object 
of a judicial 
review
The legal 
norm of an 
open legal 
policy violates 
the 1945 
Constitution
A legal 
norm of an 
open legal 
policy which 
becomes 
and object 
of a judicial 
review
A judicial review 
is based on the 
1945 Constitution
Source: Author
A condition where the legal norm is “valued as open legal policy” which is 
not identically “valued as constitutional” arised new problem since the foundation 
of the review is constitution. A legal argument is needed when that legal norm 
is reviewed twice. Those two reviews should use the same basis but the output 
are different.
Chart 1 until 3 above show something that logically can not be done by 
the Constitutional Court, that is distinguishing the difference between “the 
requirements of a review”,20 “requirements to be valued as open legal system”,21 
20  Requirements of a review is an entry gate for reviewing the constitutionality of a legal norm valued as an open 
legal policy.
21  Requirement to be valued as an open legal policy is a requirement to assess/categorize whether a legal norm 
being reviewds is an open legal policy. 
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and “requirements of open legal policy to be considered as constitutional”.22 The 
reason is the basis of three reviews are from the same basis, that is the 1945 
Constitution.
In relation to that condition which is considered as complicated, 30 verdicts 
of the Constitutional Court were chosen for the object of the research. Three 
categorizations were found. Those three categorizations were considered having 
different requirements, but in fact several requirements were also used by 
different categorizations.
Table 1
The Requirements of the Three Categorizations of the Open Legal Policy.
Criteria
Requirements of 
a Legal Norm to 
be valued as Open 
Legal Policy
Requirements 
for Proving the 
Constitutionality of 
a Legal Norm which 
Have been Valued 
as Open Legal 
Policy
Requirements 
for a Legal Norm 
(which has been 
valued as Open 
Legal Policy) so 
It Would not Be 
Reviewed
1 It does not violate the 1945 Constitution
2 It has to pay 
attention to the 
demand/postulate 
in a fair manner 
and in line with the 
moral consideration, 
religious value, 
security value, and 
public order value;
It is not an intolerable 
injustice;
It has fulfilled the 
justice;
3 It ensures the rights 
of citizen;
It does not against 
the political rights.
4  It is not conducted arbitrarily (willekeur);
5 It does not exceed and/or violate the authority 
(detournement de pouvoir);
22  Requirements of an open legal policy to be valued as constitutional is a requirement to assess/value whether 
that legal norm (which has been valued as open legal policy) is in line with the constitution or not.
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6 It does not violates 
moral values;
It does not arise 
dispute/problem in 
(an) institution(s);
7 It does not violate 
rational values;
8 It does not violate the 
sovereignty of people;
It is logically and 
legally accepted.
10 It is useful.
Source: Author
The similarities are logically not accepted. A categorization cannot have 
any similarities in requirements/criteria with other categorization. If those 
categorizations have similarities in the requirements, it means the requirements 
have to be merged into one categorization.
Chart 4
The Position of Judicial Review of Open Legal Policy in Verdicts of the 
Constitutional Court 
Not able to 
be reviewed
Requirements of a legal norm to 
be valued as an open legal policy.
Requirements for proving the 
constitutionality of a legal norm 
which have been valued as an 
open legal policy.
Requirements for a legal norm 
(which has been valued as an 
open legal policy) so it would be 
reviewed.
Be able to be 
reviewed
An Open 
Legal Policy
Sources: Author
The Criticism on the Meaning of “Open Legal Policy” in Verdicts of Judicial Review at the Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, December 2017, Volume 3, Number 2 275
The formulation done by the Constitutional Court taken from various 
verdicts, and the meaning of the open legal policy proposed by the President 
or the People Representatives Council in several judicial reviews, show tendency 
in interpreting the open legal policy as an absolute freedom for the legislator to 
formulate the norm of a law. That absolute freedom is potentially misused so a 
disadvantageous law will arise.
A freedom is actually paradoxical. The absolute freedom or limitless freedom 
of a legislator will limit and even erase the freedom of people who are regulated 
by the law. The absolute freedom also negates the constitutional understanding 
which have ben formed to appreciate and ensure the freedom of the people of 
a state.
4.2 Criticism on Open Legal Policy
From the perspective of the term, open legal policy still has inconsistency 
between the meaning of the combination of each word with the meaning desired 
by the Constitutional Court. Clearly, there is difference between the meaning 
of open legal policy from the semantic point of view with the meaning desired 
by the Constitutional Court.
The term open legal policy is formed from three words, i) policy, ii) legal, 
iii) open. The meaning from the three words are:23
a) Policy, is an option taken by an authorized party to do or not to do something 
as a response toward a particular condition;
b) Legal, is a provision made by a particular institution in order to create a 
peaceful life (and well-organized matters) by regulating the behaviour of 
the society; and
c) Open, is a freedom to choose without being affected by anyone or anything, 
whether it is in form of coercion or limitation. 
23 The three terms (Policy, Legal, Open) refer to several dictioraries. See Tim Penyusun Kamus Pusat Bahasa, “Kamus 
Besar Bahasa Indonesia, (3rd Ed., 1st Printing),” Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia, (3rd Ed., 1st Printing) (Jakarta: 
Balai Pustaka, 2001); Dheeraj and Sinha, “Legal Dictionary,” Legal Dictionary (Kuala Lumpur: International Law 
Book Services, 1996); S. L Salwsan and U Narang, “Academic’s Legal Dictionary,” Academic’s Legal Dictionary 
(New Delhi: Academic India Publisher, 2004); Bryan Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (Minnesota: West, 
2009); Susan Wild and Jonathan Wallace, “Webster’s New World,” Law Dictionary (Canada: Webster’s New World, 
2006); Elizabeth Martin, “A Dictionary of Law,” A Dictionary of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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It is quite odd to understand the open legal policy from its terms. The 
confusion is the difference between grammatical meaning and real meaning 
desired by the Constitutional Court. There is also a contradiction between each 
terms used in the phrase “Open Legal Policy”. The term open legal policy as a 
legal term has failed to give an appropriate meaning since it raises confusion. 
The reason behind the unclear meaning of open legal policy is that the three 
words does not belong to the same level and categorization.
In line with Gilbert Ryle, this case is like a category mistake,24 
 that is when the two terms from different categorizations are combined without 
any explanation. When the word “policy”, “legal”, and “open” are considered at 
the same level, the meaning of the combination of the three terms is “an act, 
a verdict, a draft of regulation, in the field of law which can be done freely by 
legislators”. Is it the correct meaning desired by the Constitutional Court? 
To know the desired meaning of an Open Legal Policy, a reposition of 
each word building the term is needed. The circle/environment where the 
terms are used is obligatory to be known. Different circle will define different 
meaning. Ludwig Wittgenstein II argues,25 “Don’t ask for the meaning, ask for 
the use ... Every kind of statement has his own kind of logic”.26 This is in line 
with Kaelan “... the meaning of a word is its use in the sentence, the meaning 
of a sentence is its use in the language, and the meaning if a language is its 
use in different contexts in life”.27
Therefore, the term “legal” needs to be understood together with its context 
(in relation to the establishment of law). The term “legal” cannot be understood 
by using broad meaning (in general way). After that, the term “policy” can be 
combined with the term “legal”, and the meaning of “policy” can be understood 
as an activity to create laws.
24 Based on Gilbert Ryle, a category mistake is “... a mistake that happens when someone tries to describe a fact 
about a particular group/categorization by using characteristics of other group(s)”. See Rizal Mustansyir, Filsafat 
Analitik: Sejarah, Perkembangan, dan Peranan Para Tokohnya (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2007), 118. Compare 
Adelbert Snijders, Manusia dan Kebenaran: Sebuah Filsafat Pengetahuan (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2006), 139–40.
25 Snijders, Manusia Dan Kebenaran: Sebuah Filsafat Pengetahuan, 112–13. See K Bertens, Filsafat Barat Kontemporer: 
Inggris-Jerman (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2002), 52–53.
26 Snijders, Manusia Dan Kebenaran: Sebuah Filsafat Pengetahuan, 138.
27 Kaelan, “Filsafat Analitis Menurut Ludwig Wittgenstein: Relevansinya Bagi Pengembangan Pragmatik,” Jurnal 
Humaniora 16, no. 2 (2004). Compare to Mustansyir, Filsafat Analitik: Sejarah, Perkembangan, Dan Peranan Para 
Tokohnya.
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The term “open” is not at the same level as the two previous terms. It is 
lower than them and the meaning of “open” has to be understood by using its 
context, that is the context of a judicial review. The term “open” will have an 
appropriate meaning and will not against the term “legal” when the position of 
“open” is lower than the term “legal policy”.
When the level of the term “open” is lower than the phrase “legal policy” of 
legislators in a context of judicial review, the meaning of the term “open” is a 
freedom for legislators to interpret the 1945 Constitution, but the freedom still 
get to follow a judicial review by other institution outside the legislators – in 
casu the Constitutional Court.
The effort to know the real meaning of an open legal policy found its 
supporting argument. This argument is in form of the aim of a judicial review. 
The aim of a concept of a judicial review will raise ideas of new open legal policy 
which can be developed. It is also aimed to limit its authority. The concept of 
open legal policy needs to be reviewed through a judical review. If the concept 
of the open legal policy is not appropriate/does not pass the judicial review, the 
formulation is not correct/appropriate.
John Agresto formulates 10 main points of judicial review by a judicial 
institution, that is:28
1. To protect the constitution as the supreme law;
2. To ensure the implementation of the aim of the constitution;
3. To give protection to the fundamental values of the country written in the 
constitution;
4. To control the legislative;
5. To ensure the implementation of a country and make the people of the 
country respect and obey the constitution;
6. To ensure the implementation of checks and balances principle;
7. To avoid a tyrannical majority or to control the principle of majority law;
8. To implement the values and principles of constitutional democracy;
28 Benny Harman, Mempertimbangkan Mahkamah Konstitusi: Sejarah Pemikiran Pengujian UU terhadap UUD (Jakarta: 
KPG, 2013), 95–96.
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9. To implement the ideology of rule of law state.
10. To keep the consistency of the hierarchy of the legal norms.
The new understanding about the open legal policy is from the logic of 
stufenbau which is established by Kelsen dan Nawiasky, that is all the laws and 
regulations have to be assessed and reviewed by the higher norms. If there is 
a law which cannot be reviewed (where that law is not the supreme/highest 
law), this condition is against the concept of stefenbau which causes a violation 
towards the existence of legal norms above the law.
The absence of control towards the legislators causes a tyrannical majority as 
it is worried by Agresto. This tyranny arises since the law becomes the supreme/
highest law and replaces the 1945 Constitution.
4.3 The Circle of Constitutionality
To be more comprehensive in understanding the position of an open legal 
policy in a verdict of a judicial review conducted by the Constitutional Court, 
the circle/the environment of the constitutionality is also needed to be known 
as it is seen on the chart.
Chart 5
The Concept of The Circle of Constitutionality
Circle 2 and 3 causes chances 
for a norm of an open legal 
policy to exist
(1)
(3)
(2)
(1) Circle of explicit order of the constitution; 
(2) Circle of implicit order of the constitution;
(3) Circle which is created after the implementation of the two circles mentioned 
above.
Source: Author
The Criticism on the Meaning of “Open Legal Policy” in Verdicts of Judicial Review at the Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, December 2017, Volume 3, Number 2 279
The chart of Circles of Constitutionality above consists of three concentric 
circles. The first circle is inside the second circle. The second circle is inside 
the third circle. Each circle represents a categorization of a particular norm of 
a constitution:
1. The explicit order of the 1945 Constitution, is a circle consisting clear 
constitutional norms which are mentioned/ordered by the 1945 Constitution. 
To understand the meaning of these norms, it is needed to read word, 
phrase, or sentence of the article and/or paragraph consisting the norms. 
29For instance, the norm in Article 4 paragraph (2) and Article 6A paragraph 
(2) of the 1945 Constitution.
2. The implicit order of the 1945 Constitution, is a circle consisting of 
constitutional norms which the contents are not mentioned/ordered directly 
by the 1945 Constitution. To find the implicit norm, a deep interpretation is 
needed. For instance, the Article 22E paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution 
which states: “General elections are conducted by a commission of general 
elections having national, permanent, and autonomous character”. The 
Indonesia’s Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) is not regulated by the 
1945 Constitution, but the Constitutional Court interprets the Article 22E 
paragraph (5) teleologically so the The Indonesia’s Election Supervisory Body 
is included as the part of “General Election Commission”.30
3. A circle created due to the implementation of the two other circles (explicit 
and implicit).
The idea of the the third circle is inspired from the questions delivered by M 
V. Tushnet about the existence of constitution outside the current constitution 
in the tradition of state administration in the US.31 In context in Indonesia, 
29 In the method of constitutional interpretation, this interpretationis known as grammatical interpretation. See 
Mertokusumo, Penemuan Hukum Sebuah Pengantar, 56–78.
30 See the verdict of the Constitutional Court Number Judicial Review Number. 22 of 2007 on General Election, No. 
11/PUU-VIII/2010 (The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2010). See also Mardian Wibowo, “Justices’ 
Freedom of Constitutional Interpretation Method in The Indonesian Constitutional Court,” Mimbar Hukum 25, no. 
2 (n.d.): 290–91.
31 Tushned states that “a constitution outside the circle of constitution” is a set of norms created from the prac-
tice of a state administration where the practice is the order of the constitution or being ordered directly by 
the constitution. The term“The Constitution Outside the Constitution” can be found in Mark Tushnet, Why The 
Constitution Matters (London: Yale University Publisher, 2010), 7. Hans Kelsen differentiates between a formal 
constitution from material constitution. The formal one is “a Constitution with a capital ‘C’; a single document 
which purports to define institutions of the state and delineates their relative powers and duties”. On the other-
hand, material constitution “…consists of those legal rules that regulate the production of other (general) legal 
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a norm which is created as the result  from the implementation of the two 
other norms consists of people’s customs/habit existing before Indonesia 
exists, then it develops into states admininstration. The most obvious 
example of the third circle is about the convention of state administration 
in form of deliberations in a session conducted by the People’s Consultative 
Assembly.32 This method is not regulated in the 1945 Constitution but it 
becomes prioritized obligation in the session it self. However, when the 
People’s Consultative Assembly does not conduct a deliberations, they just 
do voting, this matter is a violation of the law.33
Another example is the Law 12/2011 about the establishment of Laws and 
Regulations (Law 12/2011). The result of the judicial review of this law 
should be as a reviewed norm. However, the result of the existence Article 
51A paragraph (3) from Law of the Constitutional Court is assigning the 
Law 12/2011 to be the foundation of the Judicial review. Therefore, the role 
of the Law 12/2011 is as a constitution.
In relation to the open legal policy, the norms exist between the second 
and the third norm are norms which give a chance/possibility for the new open 
legal policy.
4.4 The New Meaning of an Open Legal Policy 
Open legal policy should be divided into two, those are i) an absolute open 
legal policy, and ii) a relative open legal policy. It is possible to create another 
type of open legal policy outside the two mentioned before.
An absolute open legal policy is a policy which cannot be reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court. This policy is a conception which becomes the basis of 
rules; the constitution is the highest level of law within national law”. According to Kelsen, not all the states have 
a formal constitution, but all states must have material constitution. See N. W Barber, The Constitutional State 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 75–76.
32  Refering to stufenbau Kelsen and Nawiasky, the deliberation is a norm of presupposition (a norm which is pre-
supposed as a very basis from the hierarchy of a norm). However, the exstence of a deliberation as a convention 
in a state adminsistration can be considered as other laws outside the law of a state. I Nyoman Nurjaya conveys 
that, “...empirically a law in a society can be explained in form of state law, it is also in form of relihious law, 
customary law. However, from the point of view anthropology, the inner order mechanism or self-regulation in 
the communties is law whose function is as a tool to keep the social life”. See I Nyoman Nurjaya, “Perkembangan 
Pemikiran Konsep Pluralisme Hukum” (Konferensi Internasional tentang Penguasaan Tanah dan Kekayaan Alam 
di Indonesia, Jakarta, 2004), 10.
33  Compare to Barber’s argument about customs position in constitution. See Barber, The Constitutional State, 
85–86. 
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freedom of a particular state. If this absolute open legal policy does not exist, 
the state will not be able to run the state freely. Explicitly, this absolute policy 
does not have any legal foundation in the 1945 constitution. However, implicitly, 
the legal foundation of this open legal policy can be found in the provisions 
regulating the authority of the president, People’s Representatives Councils, and 
Regional Representatives Council. 
This absolute open legal policy is about what material that will be regulated 
in a law, for instance about the bio diversity, koperasi (cooperatives), and business 
competition, etc. The constitutionality of those materials cannot be reviewed 
since the what do not contain any moral values, usage values, or other values. 
Its characteristic is free from any value.
A characteristic of what which cannot be reviewed does not automatically 
make a law consisting of what becomes not able to be reviewed. The review 
towards the what and a review towards the law consisting the what are two 
different matters. Every law can be filed to the Constitutional Court. In a judicial 
review, the Constitutional Court is not allowed to deny a petition. However, if the 
material of the petition is about the what, the Constitutional Court still conduct 
a hearing and the verdict of the hearing will be “denied”. In brief, things that 
are included in what are noun.34 So, it can be said that any noun can be chosen 
as the object of a law by legislators.
From analytics and linguistics perspectives,35 as a material, the what is in 
form of a noun which does not have any reference except from the what itself. A 
noun should be neutral. The act of a human being that will result a difference 
in a noun. A rope –as a noun-, it is a neutral matter for the first time, but it 
will have negative meaning when someone uses it as a hanging sentence. On 
the other hand, it will give positif meaning when someone uses it as a tool to 
pull a bucket of water.
34  In linguistics (Indonesian language) a word is devided into two, i) lexical  and ii) order. A lexical word has lexical 
meaning. A lexical word is devided into a) noun, b) verb, c) adjective, and d) adverb. While the order word does 
not refer to those things, but the aims is to show the grammatical relation in a construction. See S Effendi, 
Kentjono Djoko, and Suhardi Basuki, Tata Bahasa Dasar Bahasa Indonesia (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2015), 
31–34.
35  Compare to J.J. H. Bruggink Rechts-Reflecties, Grondbegrippen uit de rechtstheorie translated by B. Arief Sidharta 
about “Hukum dan Ilmu Bahasa”. See J. J. H Bruggink, Refleksi tentang Hukum (Bandung: Citra Aditya Bakti, 
1999), 18, 31–35. 
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A material of a law that can be reviewed is how material. The how indeed 
has purposes. The implementation of the how is related to the interest of other 
people. A regulation related to doctors have not had benefit or disadvantage for 
anyone. This statement will be different if there is a norm stating that doctors 
can be prosecuted for their medical treatment which is considered as harmful/
malpractice, although the doctors have been reviewed by the Honorary Council 
of Indonesian Medical Discipline.36 The provision which regulates the how of the 
doctors becomes a provision whose constitutionality can be reviewed. Meanwhile, 
the doctors, as the what who were chosen to be regulated, their constitutionality 
cannot be reviewed since doctors are in the area of free values.
How, a regulated material of a law is in the area (part of) the relative open 
legal policy. It means that the legislators are authorized to formulate any law 
they want since the 1945 Constitution does not regulate the provision of that 
material. However, the principles behind how should or even has to be reviewed 
(by the Constitutional Court) towards the 1945 Constitution. The reason is because 
the basis principle of the how is principles which are not free from any values.
Chart 6
The Ideal Position of Open Legal Policy in a Judicial Review of Norms 
of Law
Open legal 
policy
absolute
relative
Constitutional
Might be 
constitutional or 
unconstitutional Not part of open legal policy
Norm 
of Law
Judicial review
Source: Author
36 See Judicial Review Number 29 of 2004 on Medical Practice against the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia, No. 14/PUU-XII/2014 (The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2014).
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This research proposes that the concept of a relative open legal policy is 
defined as an authority of a legislator to choose and formulate a norm of law which 
does not have an explicit reference in 1945 Constitution, where the formulation 
of that norm can not against the i) implicit norm of the 1945 Constitution; and 
ii) norms from the implementation of explicit norm or implicit norm of the 
1945 Constitution.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
In various verdicts, the Constitutional Court has not explicitly defined the 
open legal policy. However, the term open legal policy has been implicitly defined 
as legal policy which can be made by legislator when the 1945 Constitution does 
not regulate the content material of the law that will be established.
The analysis of several verdicts of the Constitutional Court found three 
requirements for the categorization of the open legal policy. This research found 
ideal criteria of a norm of law which are included in the categorization of the 
open legal policy, those are:
a. Criteria for the categorization of the absolute open legal policy:
• The norm is not clearly regulated in the 1945 Constitution;
• The norm which consists the what (about the chosen object that will 
be regulated).
b. Criteria for the categorization of the relative open legal policy:
• The norm is not clearly regulated in the 1945 Constitution;
• The norm which consists the how of an object of law that will be 
regulated;
• It does not violate the 1945 Constitution. 
Based on the findings about the meaning of open legal policy, the author 
suggests that the Constitutiona Court can do the following matters related to 
the judicial review:
1. Clearly differentiate between an absolute open legal policy from the relative 
open legal policy;
The Criticism on the Meaning of “Open Legal Policy” in Verdicts of Judicial Review at the Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, December 2017, Volume 3, Number 2284
2. A judicial review of the norm of relative open legal policy is reviewed 
by using implicit norm of the 1945 Constitution and the norm from the 
implementation of 1945 Constitution.
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